Abstract
INTRODUCTION
This is an important book. It will prove fascinating for all economics junkies, plus those interested in any and all Nobel Prizes, whether or not in the dismal science. I learned a lot from this publication, and highly recommend it on that basis. Perhaps a more descriptive, and marketable title for it would have been "Everything you ever wanted to know about the Nobel Prize in Economics, and about those who have given, and been given this award." The authors call such people Nobel Prize Winners (NPW) and I shall follow their lead on this.
This book explains the choices of the Nobel Prize committee; they are based, mainly, but not solely, on past citations to their publications, and, also, on who are the acknowledged leaders in this field. Very helpful was their application of the Bass Model of innovation (chapter 6). There, among many other insights, we can easily see which NPWs boosted the prize (had many cites beforehand), and those who were enhanced by it (relatively more cites afterward). I greatly enjoyed reading about how well non-winners (born too early) such as Adam Smith, Karl Marx, John Maynard Keynes and Alfred Marshall stacked up in this way against the actual NPWs: pretty darn well. Ditto for Nobelabiles (Cardinals who might reasonably become Pope are called Papabile) such as Joan Robinson, J.K. Galbraith, who, claim our authors, were cheated out of this well-deserved award by right wing committee members, mainly, Assar Lindbeck. 
MAJOR ERRORS
Let us now consider some of its, unfortunately, numerous weaknesses. According to the authors, right-wing economists do not really care about unemployment (p. 150). For them, it is "voluntary," akin to "agreeable idleness." It is sort of like a vacation, which no one can oppose. In contrast, leftists are vitally concerned about this social problem. Their solution? Strengthening labor unions and aggregate demand. This is problematic. They offer no cites to these straw men of theirs. As for organized labor curing unemployment, this is erroneous. They create it, by boosting wages above productivity levels. The rust belt in the northeast of the U.S. offers ample testimony to this phenomenon. Aggregate demand? Why, then, is black teen unemployment quadruple that of adult white levels? Could this have something to do with the minimum wage law, beloved of one of these authors' favorite Gronau and several others jumped all over Lindbeck as a left winger. I suppose the political spectrum is different in Sweden than in the U.S.
These authors write as journalists; they appear very well acquainted with this subject, but do not address it qua economists. They are listed as economic historians, and I can well believe their expertise in the latter capacity; but not the former. Which basic economic errors do they commit that lead me to this opinion? Let me mention some of the ways.
"The (physical) sciences abide by this method (falsifiability, testability, predictions) and economics, when it aspires to the same esteem, is presumed to do so as well" (p. 3). Not so, not so. There are numerous economic laws that give us important information about the real world, and yet do not pass muster on this criterion. For example, there is a tendency for profits to be equal in all industries, apart from risk. Whenever voluntary trade occurs, each party values the other's possession more than his own. Both gain in the ex-ante sense. These authors (p. 50) approvingly quote Feynman as follows: "… if it disagrees with experiment, it's wrong, that's all there is to it." They accurately characterize this as "logical positivism" (p. 50), but seem blissfully unaware that any criticism has ever been leveled at this doctrine. They go so far as to write (pp. 50-51): "… after three centuries, economics has yet to come up with a single non-obvious 'law,' or universal regularity." How about trying some of these on for size (Hoppe, 1995) : "Whenever two people A and B engage in a voluntary exchange, they must both expect to profit from it. And they must have reverse preference orders for the goods and services exchanged so that A values what he receives from B more highly than what he gives to him, and B must evaluate the same things the other way around.
"Or consider this: Whenever an exchange is not voluntary but coerced, one party profits at the expense of the other.
"Or the law of marginal utility: Whenever the supply of good increases by one additional unit, 3 I assume this means we have attained full employment.
provided each unit is regarded as of equal serviceability by a person, the value attached to this unit must decrease. For this additional unit can only be employed as a means for the attainment of a goal that is considered less valuable than the least valued goal satisfied by a unit of such good if the supply were one unit shorter.
"Or take the Ricardian law of association: Of two producers, if A is more productive in the production of two types of goods than is B, they can still engage in a mutually beneficial division of labor. This is because overall physical productivity is higher if A specializes in producing one good which he can produce most efficiently, rather than both A and B producing both goods separately and autonomously.
"Or as another example: Whenever minimum wage laws are enforced that require wages to be higher than existing market wages, involuntary unemployment will result.
"Or as a final example: Whenever the quantity of money is increased while the demand for money to be held as cash reserve on hand is unchanged, the purchasing power of money will fall."
Here is a further example of their economic illiteracy:
"When there is no slack, 3 nobody can gain without somebody else losing" (p. 3). But voluntary trade, see above, disproves this claim of the market as a zero-sum game.
"… everyone gets the value of what they can sell" (p. 3). No, no, no, whenever anyone sells anything, he gets more than the value he places on his property. Otherwise, why, ever, would he agree to vend?
These authors see "rent control" (p. 6) as a means leading to "good-quality affordable housing." And, yet, every introductory microeconomic textbook properly concludes, on the basis of elementary supply and demand, the very opposite. This conclusion attains one of the highest consensuses of all questions asked of economists in surveys (Block, & Walker, 1988) . Even their favorite economist, Myrdal (1965) , had this to say about that pernicious legislation: "Rent control has in certain western countries constituted, maybe, the worst example of poor planning by governments lacking courage and vision." Not discouraged, our authors characterize this law as (p. 157): "… a social intervention intended to mitigate monopoly pricing." Here, they would appear to have taken a full leave of their senses? For the neo-classicals, "monopoly" is based on concentration ratios. But, surely, this industry is amongst the closest to "perfect competition" given its numerous sellers. For Austrian economist, this depicts restrictions on entry into the field, which can only be considered virtually non-existent, apart from government regulation.
BIAS
Offer and Soderberg criticize the free market "bias" of the Nobel Committee. Yet, they themselves are not free of this unsavory characteristic. Exhibit A: they feature Gunnar and Alva Myrdal on their front cover. Would not a group picture have been more appropriate? Exhibit B: they see Milton Friedman, throughout their book, as an exemplar of free enterprise. Not at all. Rather, he was a social democrat, 4 albeit with some few free enterprise opinions. 5 Exhibit C:
They regard Friedrich Hayek in much the same manner. Yet, the overwhelming evidence 6 fails to bear this out. 7 Their treatment of the latter economist is particularly galling. They note that "Hayek conceded some need for social insurance and other government interventions" (p. 8).
Despite these facts that they themselves mention, they still consider him an advocate of free markets. 4 Our authors are intent on shoving this economist into a free enterprise box, even though he hardly fits there. For example, they claim (p. 157) he was the "most influential adversary" of "Social Democracy." But on the very same page they admit that "He proposed a negative income tax to bring incomes up to a social minimum… Although designed as an alternative to Social Democracy (perhaps as a way of making it unnecessary, or to make it easy to abolish) it overlapped with the Social Democratic aspiration to place a floor under incomes." What does this man have to do to convince Offer and Soderberg that he is to a great degree a social democratic. "Overlapping" with their policies is, it would appear, insufficient. He is a confessed Keynesian, see below, fn. 8. Must he swear allegiance, too, to Galbraith and Karl Marx?
They characterize the early members of the Mont Pelerin Society as "some of the leading anti-labour intellectuals in Europe and America...." I presume they mean by this that Hayek, Friedman, Stigler, Ohlin, Allais, etc., were not supporters of minimum wage laws and unions. But this is not at all "antilabour." Rather, it is anti-unemployment and rust belts. Elsewhere (p. 142) this organization is described as "reactionary." Is this not the sort of bias against which we are continually warned?
The authors of this book mischaracterize Milton Friedman as an opponent of Keynesianism (p. 10). The truth of the matter is that he was a monetarist-Keynesian, albeit not a fiscalist one. States Skousen (2001): "This slide from Keynesian theory to particular policies was well illustrated in his seventh edition (1967), when Samuelson cited a statement by Milton Friedman, "We are all Keynesians now." … Friedman (1968, p. 15) would later put it this way: "We all use the Keynesian language and apparatus, none of us any longer accepts the initial Keynesian conclusions.'" 8 But, surely, the "apparatus" is far more important than and "conclusions" drawn from it, since the latter is based on the former, not the other way around.
MINOR ERRORS
In the view of Offer and Soderberg, "In 2008, the financial markets had to be rescued by governments from their follies" (p. 12). And again: "The economic crisis … was caused by financial deregulation…" (p. 14). Unhappily, we are offered not a single shred of evidence for this highly contentious claim. They also opine again in the absence of any empirical support (p. 15): "Social Democracy provides an alternative 9 that is pragmatically successful, analytically coherent, economically efficient, ethically attractive, and theoretically modest." If that is not bias, there is no such thing as that characteristic.
Here is yet another rookie error; we are told that "… the invisible hand, which implies that the pursuit of self-interest is socially beneficial. This doctrine … has never been proven, except in an abstract and exotic form." But, this is a misspecification of one of the elementary building blocks of the dismal science. Of course, the pursuit of self-interest is not always socially beneficial. One need not extend one's thought further than murder, rape, theft, terrorism. These are all "self-interested." But the invisible hand applies to none of these outrages. Rather, it is predicated upon something these authors miss: it holds only under a regime of economic freedom, private property rights, and laissez-faire capitalism. It does not at all apply to "crony capitalism," where "rent-seeking" 10 is the order of the day.
Here is an unwarranted critique of the profession of economics (p. 118): "The results are striking. To begin with, there was no unanimity. If economics was a science, there was no agreement on its core policy implications. One would hardly expect such lack of agreement over core issues in the application of physics, chemistry or biology." Note, first, the subtle change from "core policy implications" to "core issues." I have no doubt that biologists would not reach anything like unanimity on a "core policy implication" related to their subject matter such as the pro-life pro-choice debate. Nor would physicists or chemists achieve unanimity of the wisdom of U.S. military ordinance policy. The point is, in the social sciences, all of them, not just economics, "core policy implications" have to do with values, which are no part of their "core issues." Economists
Here are some more elementary errors. These authors (p. 159) maintain that "Markets failed because transactions were costly." That is a new one entirely, and might yet earn for them a Nobel Prize. But they might as well have said that "Markets failed because land, labor or capital was costly." Offer and Soderberg (p. 160) misconstrue "… public choice doctrine, whose central premise was that majority rule undermined the efficiency of free markets." As every freshman economics student full well knows, in markets, free or not, there is no "majority rule." Rather, there is unanimity; both, or all, participants in purchases, sales, lending, borrowing, renting, agree to the deal, or it simply does not take place. Where, then, does "majority rule?" In politics, of course, not economics. Further, they aver (p. 9): "Mixed economies with high levels of government intervention have reliably sustained political and economic freedoms for many decades, while laissez-faire and totalitarian regimes have not." A few examples of each might have come in handy. And, it is more than passing curious that they should equate "laissez-faire and totalitarian regimes." Surely, they are polar opposites.
One last error/oversight of theirs. I regard Murray N. Rothbard as the second-best economist (to Mises) in all of the history of our profession. Any book about the top economists who have not won this prize that fails to even mention him cannot be all good. This publication fails that litmus test.
12
Cappelli, 2013. Another howler in this regard (p. 162) is this: "… market-clearing equilibrium economics … justified the existing distribution of property and income." It did no such thing. The former is in the positive realm; the latter is normative.
CONCLUSION
Let me end this review on a positive note. Their main thesis is that the awarding of this prize has had an important effect on public policy. Have they demonstrated this? Yes, I think they have. And, this is important, since it is the duty of our profession to explain, understand and analyze economic activity. This is part and parcel of an accurate explanation, and we should all be grateful to these authors for pointing that out. 
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